[:es]Wade D. Cook (York University), Nuria Ramón (Miguel Hernández University), José L. Ruiz (Miguel Hernández University), Inmaculada Sirvent (Miguel Hernández University) and Joe Zhu (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).
Abstract. Incentive plans involve payments for performance relative to some set of goals. In this paper, we extend Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to the evaluation of performance in the specific context of pay-for-performance incentive plans. The approach proposed ensures that the evaluation of performance of decision making units (DMUs) that follow the implementation of incentive plans, is made in terms of targets that are attainable, as well as representing best practices. A model is developed that adjusts the benchmarking to the goals through the corresponding payment of incentives, thus DEA targets are established taking into consideration the improvement strategies that were set out in the incentive plans. To illustrate, we examine an application concerned with the financing of public Spanish universities.[:]
Scientific articles
N. Allouch, Luis A. Guardiola, & A. Meca (2024). Measuring productivity in networks: A game-theoretic approach. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 91, 101783.
N. Allouch (University of Kent – School of Economics), Luis A. Guardiola (Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia), Ana Meca (I.U. Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche) Abstract: Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been [...]
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