Conferencia del Prof. Dr. Marc Escrihuela Villar

Título: On the price effects of the intensity of competition and the number of competitors
Ponente: Marc Escrihuela Villar
Fecha: 13/06/2014   12:30h
Lugar: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit
Resumen:
This paper considers a theoretical model where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) and the number of firms are only imperfect substitutes in order to maximize consumer surplus. The main implication of this finding is that policy measures devoted to increase the number of competitors are more effective when the degree of collusion is small whereas the efforts to discourage tacit Collusion should be applied especially in markets with a large number of firms.
Breve Bio:
El profesor Marc Escrihuela Villar es Doctor en Economía por la Universidad de Alicante y es contratado Doctor en la Universitat de les Illes Balears en el área de Análisis económico. Ha presentado sus trabajos de investigación en numerosos congresos internacionales como EARIE y IOS, ambos en el área de Economía Industrial. Sus trabajos están publicados revistas científicas internacionales tan prestigiosas como International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics, SERIEs, entre otras.Title: On the price effects of the intensity of competition and the number of competitors
Speaker: Marc Escrihuela Villar
Date: 13/06/2014   12:30h
Location: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit
Abstract
This paper considers a theoretical model where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) and the number of firms are only imperfect substitutes in order to maximize consumer surplus. The main implication of this finding is that policy measures devoted to increase the number of competitors are more effective when the degree of collusion is small whereas the efforts to discourage tacit Collusion should be applied especially in markets with a large number of firms.
Brief Bio
El profesor Marc Escrihuela Villar es Doctor en Economía por la Universidad de Alicante y es contratado Doctor en la Universitat de les Illes Balears en el área de Análisis económico. Ha presentado sus trabajos de investigación en numerosos congresos internacionales como EARIE y IOS, ambos en el área de Economía Industrial. Sus trabajos están publicados revistas científicas internacionales tan prestigiosas como International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics, SERIEs, entre otras.