Título: Two Perspectives in Experimental Economics: From Deceptive Communication to the Development of Strategic Sophistication
Ponente: Juan Francisco Blázquiz Pulido (IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca & University of Alicante)
Fecha y hora: 21/03/2025, 12:30
Inscripción obligatoria hasta completar aforo: https://forms.gle/iqd3vWjiuvZwVrL17
Lugar: Sala de Seminarios del Edificio Torretamarit (CIO) y online
Organizador: Ana Meca Martínez
Abstract:
Understanding how people process information and the intention behind their decisions is central to many economic contexts. This presentation covers two studies in distinct areas of experimental economics that involve strategic interactions: identifying deceptive intentions in communication and the development of strategic sophistication in varying environments. The first paper studies individuals’ intentions in games where players can truthfully communicate with deceiving purposes. We use a novel experimental design that combines a sender-receiver game with potential strategic considerations and a counterfactual game with no room for hidden misleading intentions. We develop a new method to identify deceptive intentions, distinguishing actual deceivers from pessimistic truth-tellers and those who excuse previous deceiving statements. Overall, our method identifies more deceptive intentions than previous approaches. The second study investigates how individuals learn and adapt their strategic reasoning based on the sophistication of their counterparts. Using an eye-tracking experiment, we analyze how interactions with naive, strategic, or other-regarding players shape an individual’s ability to develop higher strategic sophistication. Finally, we examine whether this learning is transferable to new environments or remains specific to the setting where it was acquired.