Conferencia del Prof. Dr. Roberto Lucchetti

Título: Equilibrios fuertes de Nash en juegos finitos
Ponente: Roberto Luchetti
Fecha: 19/06/2014   12:40h
Lugar: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit
Resumen:
It is well known that the basic idea of Nash Equilibrium in noncooperative theory does not in general enjoy some form of collective efficiency/fairness. For this reason Aumann introduced the idea of strong Nash Equilibrium, and subsequent variants were presented in the literature. However as the prisoner dilemma shows, not all (finite) games possess strong Nash equilibria. Thus a natural question arises: «how many games do possess strong Nash equilibria»? In this talk we see that, even if this set is not small in the usual category/measure sense, the property can be considered «exceptional». The result is particularly neat in the case of two players.
Breve Bio:
Roberto Lucchetti es catedrático en el Departamento de Matemáticas “Francesco Brioschi” de la Universidad Politécnica de Milán.Title: Strong Nash equilibria in finite games
Speaker: Roberto Lucchetti
Date: 19/06/2014   12:40h
Location: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit
Abstract
It is well known that the basic idea of Nash Equilibrium in noncooperative theory does not in general enjoy some form of collective efficiency/fairness. For this reason Aumann introduced the idea of strong Nash Equilibrium, and subsequent variants were presented in the literature. However as the prisoner dilemma shows, not all (finite) games possess strong Nash equilibria. Thus a natural question arises: «how many games do possess strong Nash equilibria»? In this talk we see that, even if this set is not small in the usual category/measure sense, the property can be considered «exceptional». The result is particularly neat in the case of two players.
Brief Bio
Roberto Lucchetti es catedrático en el Departamento de Matemáticas “Francesco Brioschi” de la Universidad Politécnica de Milán.