{"id":809,"date":"2014-06-17T17:34:18","date_gmt":"2014-06-17T15:34:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/?p=809"},"modified":"2014-06-17T17:34:18","modified_gmt":"2014-06-17T15:34:18","slug":"conferencia-del-prof-dr-roberto-lucchetti","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/2014\/06\/17\/conferencia-del-prof-dr-roberto-lucchetti\/","title":{"rendered":"Conferencia del Prof. Dr. Roberto Lucchetti"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!--:es--><strong>T\u00edtulo<\/strong>: Equilibrios fuertes de Nash en juegos finitos<br \/>\n<strong>Ponente<\/strong>:\u00a0Roberto Luchetti<br \/>\n<strong>Fecha<\/strong>: 19\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:40h<br \/>\n<strong>Lugar<\/strong>: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\n<strong>Resumen:<\/strong><br \/>\nIt is well known that the basic idea of Nash Equilibrium in noncooperative theory does not in general enjoy some form of collective efficiency\/fairness. For this reason Aumann introduced the idea of strong Nash Equilibrium, and subsequent variants were presented in the literature. However as the prisoner dilemma shows, not all (finite) games possess strong Nash equilibria. Thus a natural question arises: \u00abhow many games do possess strong Nash equilibria\u00bb? In this talk we see that, even if this set is not small in the usual category\/measure sense, the property can be considered \u00abexceptional\u00bb. The result is particularly neat in the case of two players.<br \/>\n<strong>Breve Bio:<\/strong><br \/>\nRoberto Lucchetti es catedr\u00e1tico en el Departamento de Matem\u00e1ticas \u201cFrancesco Brioschi\u201d de la Universidad Polit\u00e9cnica de Mil\u00e1n.<!--:--><!--:en--><strong>Title<\/strong>:\u00a0Strong Nash equilibria in finite games<br \/>\n<strong>Speaker<\/strong>:\u00a0Roberto Lucchetti<br \/>\n<strong>Date<\/strong>: 19\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:40h<br \/>\n<strong>Location<\/strong>: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\n<strong>Abstract<\/strong><br \/>\nIt is well known that the basic idea of Nash Equilibrium in noncooperative theory does not in general enjoy some form of collective efficiency\/fairness. For this reason Aumann introduced the idea of strong Nash Equilibrium, and subsequent variants were presented in the literature. However as the prisoner dilemma shows, not all (finite) games possess strong Nash equilibria. Thus a natural question arises: \u00abhow many games do possess strong Nash equilibria\u00bb? In this talk we see that, even if this set is not small in the usual category\/measure sense, the property can be considered \u00abexceptional\u00bb. The result is particularly neat in the case of two players.<br \/>\n<strong>Brief Bio<\/strong><br \/>\nRoberto Lucchetti es catedr\u00e1tico en el Departamento de Matem\u00e1ticas \u201cFrancesco Brioschi\u201d de la Universidad Polit\u00e9cnica de Mil\u00e1n.<!--:--><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>T\u00edtulo: Equilibrios fuertes de Nash en juegos finitos<br \/>\nPonente:\u00a0Roberto Luchetti<br \/>\nFecha: 19\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:40h<br \/>\nLugar: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\nResumen:<br \/>\nIt is well known that the basic idea of Nash Equilibrium in noncooperative theory does not in general enjoy some form of collective efficiency\/fairness. For this reason Aumann introduced the idea of strong Nash Equilibrium, and subsequent variants were presented [&#8230;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":3477,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[4,873],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/809"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3477"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=809"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/809\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=809"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=809"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=809"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}