{"id":800,"date":"2014-06-13T11:39:05","date_gmt":"2014-06-13T09:39:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/?p=800"},"modified":"2014-06-13T11:39:05","modified_gmt":"2014-06-13T09:39:05","slug":"conferencia-del-prof-dr-marc-escrihuela-villar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/2014\/06\/13\/conferencia-del-prof-dr-marc-escrihuela-villar\/","title":{"rendered":"Conferencia del Prof. Dr. Marc Escrihuela Villar"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!--:es--><strong>T\u00edtulo<\/strong>: On the price effects of the intensity of competition and the number of competitors<br \/>\n<strong>Ponente<\/strong>: Marc Escrihuela Villar<br \/>\n<strong>Fecha<\/strong>: 13\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:30h<br \/>\n<strong>Lugar<\/strong>: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\n<strong>Resumen:<\/strong><br \/>\nThis paper considers a theoretical model where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) and the number of firms are only imperfect substitutes in order to maximize consumer surplus. The main implication of this finding is that policy measures devoted to increase the number of competitors are more effective when the degree of collusion is small whereas the efforts to discourage tacit Collusion should be applied especially in markets with a large number of firms.<br \/>\n<strong>Breve Bio:<\/strong><br \/>\nEl profesor Marc Escrihuela Villar es Doctor en Econom\u00eda por la Universidad de Alicante y es contratado Doctor en la Universitat de les Illes Balears en el \u00e1rea de An\u00e1lisis econ\u00f3mico. Ha presentado sus trabajos de investigaci\u00f3n en numerosos congresos internacionales como EARIE y IOS, ambos en el \u00e1rea de Econom\u00eda Industrial. Sus trabajos est\u00e1n publicados revistas cient\u00edficas internacionales tan prestigiosas como International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics, SERIEs, entre otras.<!--:--><!--:en--><strong>Title<\/strong>: On the price effects of the intensity of competition and the number of competitors<br \/>\n<strong>Speaker<\/strong>: Marc Escrihuela Villar<br \/>\n<strong>Date<\/strong>: 13\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:30h<br \/>\n<strong>Location<\/strong>: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\n<strong>Abstract<\/strong><br \/>\nThis paper considers a theoretical model where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) and the number of firms are only imperfect substitutes in order to maximize consumer surplus. The main implication of this finding is that policy measures devoted to increase the number of competitors are more effective when the degree of collusion is small whereas the efforts to discourage tacit Collusion should be applied especially in markets with a large number of firms.<br \/>\n<strong>Brief Bio<\/strong><br \/>\nEl profesor Marc Escrihuela Villar es Doctor en Econom\u00eda por la Universidad de Alicante y es contratado Doctor en la Universitat de les Illes Balears en el \u00e1rea de An\u00e1lisis econ\u00f3mico. Ha presentado sus trabajos de investigaci\u00f3n en numerosos congresos internacionales como EARIE y IOS, ambos en el \u00e1rea de Econom\u00eda Industrial. Sus trabajos est\u00e1n publicados revistas cient\u00edficas internacionales tan prestigiosas como International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economics, SERIEs, entre otras.<!--:--><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>T\u00edtulo: On the price effects of the intensity of competition and the number of competitors<br \/>\nPonente: Marc Escrihuela Villar<br \/>\nFecha: 13\/06\/2014\u00a0\u00a0 12:30h<br \/>\nLugar: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit<br \/>\nResumen:<br \/>\nThis paper considers a theoretical model where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree [&#8230;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":3477,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[4,873],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/800"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3477"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=800"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/800\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=800"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=800"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=800"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}