{"id":17230,"date":"2020-11-18T10:01:46","date_gmt":"2020-11-18T10:01:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cio.edu.umh.es\/?p=17230"},"modified":"2021-07-22T09:49:57","modified_gmt":"2021-07-22T07:49:57","slug":"seminario-online-francesco-ciardiello","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/2020\/11\/18\/seminario-online-francesco-ciardiello\/","title":{"rendered":"Seminario Online Francesco Ciardiello"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[:es]<strong>T\u00edtulo:<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0<b>\u00a0<\/b>On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ponente:\u00a0<\/strong>Francesco Ciardiello (Sheffield University Management School)<\/p>\n<p><strong>Organizador:\u00a0<\/strong>Ana Meca<\/p>\n<p><strong>Date:\u00a0<\/strong>Lunes 30<span class=\"gmail_default\">\u00a0de noviembre<\/span>\u00a0de 2020 a las 12:00<\/p>\n<p>[button link=\u00bbhttps:\/\/youtu.be\/r9ex-Uu7JIg\u00bb color=\u00bbgreen\u00bb] PINCHA AQU\u00cd PARA VER EL SEMINARIO[\/button]<\/p>\n<p><strong>ABSTRACT:<\/strong>\u00a0This paper develops a duopolistic discounted marketing model with linear advertising costs and advertised prices for mature markets still in expansion. Generic and predatory advertising effects are combined together in the model. We characterize a class of adver- tising models with some lowered production costs. For such a class of models, advertising investments have a no-free-riding strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if discount rates are small. We discuss the entity of this efficiency at varying parameters of our advertising model. We provide a computational framework in which market shares can be computed at\u00a0equilibrium, too. We analyze market share dynamics for an asymmetrical numerical scenario where one of the two firms is more effective in generic and predatory\u00a0advertising. Several numerical insights on market share dynamics are obtained. Our computational framework allows for different scenarios in practical applications and it is developed, thanks to\u00a0Mathematica\u00a0software.<\/p>\n<p><i style=\"color: #3c4043;font-family: Roboto, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif\">\u00a0<\/i>[:]<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[:es]T\u00edtulo:\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model<br \/>\nPonente:\u00a0Francesco Ciardiello (Sheffield University Management School)<br \/>\nOrganizador:\u00a0Ana Meca<br \/>\nFecha:\u00a0Lunes 30\u00a0de noviembre\u00a0de 2020 a las 12:00<br \/>\n[button link=\u00bbhttps:\/\/youtu.be\/r9ex-Uu7JIg\u00bb color=\u00bbgreen\u00bb] PINCHA AQU\u00cd PARA VER EL SEMINARIO[\/button]<br \/>\nABSTRACT:\u00a0This paper develops a duopolistic discounted marketing model with linear advertising costs and advertised prices for mature markets still in expansion. Generic and predatory advertising effects [&#8230;]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[4,873],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17230"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17230"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17230\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17230"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17230"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cio.umh.es\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17230"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}